Contemporary science presents us with the remarkable theory that the universe began to exist about fifteen billion years ago with a cataclysmic explosion called "the Big Bang." The question of whether Big Bang cosmology supports theism or atheism has long been a matter of discussion among the general public and in popular science books, but has received scant attention from philosophers. This book sets out to fill this gap by means of a sustained debate between two philosophers, William Lane (...) Craig and Quentin Smith, who defend opposing positions. Craig argues that the Big Bang that began the universe was created by God, while Smith argues that the Big Bang has no cause. Alternating chapters by the two philosophers criticize and attempt to refute preceding arguments. Their arguments are based on Einstein's theory of relativity and include a discussion of the new quantum cosmology recently developed by Stephen Hawking and popularized in A Brief History of Time. (shrink)

The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices.

Observations of a sea urchin larvae show that most species adopt one of two life history strategies. One strategy is to make numerous small eggs, which develop into a larva with a required feeding period in the water column before metamorphosis. In contrast, the second strategy is to make fewer large eggs with a larva that does not feed, which reduces the time to metamorphosis and thus the time spent in the water column. The larvae associated with each strategy have (...) distinct morphologies and developmental processes that reflect their feeding requirements, so that those that feed exhibit indirect development with a complex larva, and those that do not feed form a morphologically simplified larva and exhibit direct development. Phylogenetic studies show that, in sea urchins, a feeding larva, the pluteus, is the ancestral form and the morphologically simplified direct‐developing larva is derived. The current hypothesis for evolution of the direct‐developing larval form in sea urchins suggests that major developmental changes occur by neutral loss of larval features after the crucial transition to a nonfeeding life history strategy. We present evidence from Clypeaster rosaceus, a sea urchin with a life history intermediate to the two strategies, which indicates that major developmental changes for accelerated development have been selected for in a larva that can still feed and maintains an outward, pluteus morphology. We suggest that transformation of larval form has resulted from strong selection on early initiation and acceleration of adult development. BioEssays 29:566–571, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity is an anthology of original essays by an international team of leading philosophers and physicists who have come together to reassess the contemporary paradigm of the relativistic concept of time. A great deal has changed since 1905 when Einstein proposed his Special Theory of Relativity, and this book offers a fresh reassessment of Special Relativity’s relativistic concept of time in terms of epistemology, metaphysics, and physics.

As in other societies, medical professionalism in the Peoples’ Republic of China has been rapidly evolving. One of the major events in this process was the endorsement in 2005 of the document, “Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter,” by the Chinese Medical Doctor Association (hereafter, the Charter). More recently, a national survey, the first on such a large scale, was conducted on Chinese physicians’ attitudes toward the fundamental principles and core commitments put forward in the Charter. Based (...) on empirical findings from that study and comparing them to the published results of a similar American survey, the authors offer an in-depth interpretation of significant cross-cultural differences and important transcultural commonalities. The broader historical, socio-economic, and ethical issues relating to salient Chinese cultural practices such as family consent, familism (the custom of deferring decisions to family members), and the withholding of medical information, as well as controversial topics such as not respecting patients’ autonomy, are examined. The Chinese Survey found that Chinese physicians supported the principles of the Charter in general. Here we argue that Chinese culture and traditional medical ethics are broadly compatible with the moral commitments demanded by modern medical professionalism. Methodologically and theoretically—recognizing the problems inherent in the hoary but still popular habit of dichotomizing cultures and in relativism—a transcultural approach is adopted that gives greater (due) weight to the internal moral diversity present within every culture, the common ground shared by different cultures, and the primacy of morality. Genuine crosscultural dialogue, including a constructive Chinese-American dialogue in the area of medical professionalism, is not only possible, but necessary. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has demonstrated Molina’s rejection of transworld damnation, claiming instead that there is at least one feasible world where any individual is freely saved, lost, or does not exist. This article argues that one can subscribe to Molina’s doctrine of individual predestination while maintaining, with William Lane Craig, that no actual person who fails to hear the gospel and is lost would have been saved in some feasible world where s/he heard the gospel. As part of the divine (...) deliberation, God could narrow down the spectrum of feasible worlds to a lower-order spectrum by factoring out worlds which, among other conditions, contain anyone who does not fall into either of two types. The first type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive only general revelation at the moment of salvation, lost in at least one world where they receive only general revelation, and lost in every world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation. The second type comprises persons saved in at least one world where they receive special revelation without first appropriating salvation through general revelation and lost in at least one comparable world. (shrink)

A new approach to the ancient world is only too often a wrong approach, unless it is based on some concrete discovery. But I think it fair to talk of newperspectives, at least, in the study of Greek mythology. Certainly the old and familiar ones are no longer adequate. Indeed it is surprising, in the light of fresh intuitions about society, literacy, the pre-Homeric world, and relations with the ancient Near East, that myth—one of the most pervasive aspects of Greek (...) culture—has been left in its old and rather cobwebby pigeon-hole. Rose's simple paraphrases are accepted as adequate for students; Nilsson's sparse pages in his history of religion are rightly respected, though some of them are too simple; the Murray-Cook-Harrison-Cornford reconstruction of religion, ritual and myth is regarded as a little excessive, but perhaps not too far out; Kerényi and Eliade are roughly tolerated, if not widely read by Classicists, and their books are ordered in profusion for the library; the psychological side is adequately taken care of, or so it is supposed, by what is left from Freud and Jung, with Cassirer as sufficient authority for the sources of mythical imagination.Many of these critics had their moments of brilliant insight, but most were misleading in their theories taken as a whole. We can now accept that many myths have ritual counterparts, and some have ritual origins, without having to adopt Cornford's belief, developed after Harrison, Frazer and Robertson Smith, that all myths are such. (shrink)

An argument given by kirk ("analysis" 33.6) against quine's 1970 defense of his indeterminacy thesis is discussed. It is shown that kirk's claim that quine's argument is self-Defeating is unacceptable.

William Lane Craig has claimed that Platonism is incompatible theologically with Christian theism in that it undermines God’s aseity. He develops three main objections to Platonism, as well as his own nominalist theory of reference, for which he draws from philosophy of language. However, I rebut his arguments. I argue that, unlike on Platonism, his view will not preserve a real essence of intentionality. Without that, his view undermines our abilities to know reality. As an implication, I also will (...) highlight the importance methodologically of approaching this issue from the primacy of the ontology of knowledge, not philosophy of language. (shrink)

Essays that put noted political thinkers of the past—including Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Wollstonecraft, Marx, and Confucius—in dialogue with current environmental political theory. Contemporary environmental political theory considers the implications of the environmental crisis for such political concepts as rights, citizenship, justice, democracy, the state, race, class, and gender. As the field has matured, scholars have begun to explore connections between Green Theory and such canonical political thinkers as Plato, Machiavelli, Locke, and Marx. The essays in this volume put important figures (...) from the political theory canon in dialogue with current environmental political theory. It is the first comprehensive volume to bring the insights of Green Theory to bear in reinterpreting these canonical theorists. Individual essays cover such classical figures in Western thought as Aristotle, Hume, Rousseau, Mill, and Burke, but they also depart from the traditional canon to consider Mary Wollstonecraft, W. E. B. Du Bois, Hannah Arendt, and Confucius. Engaging and accessible, the essays also offer original and innovative interpretations that often challenge standard readings of these thinkers. In examining and explicating how these great thinkers of the past viewed the natural world and our relationship with nature, the essays also illuminate our current environmental predicament. Essays on Plato • Aristotle • Niccolò Machiavelli • Thomas Hobbes • John Locke • David Hume • Jean-Jacques Rousseau • Edmund Burke • Mary Wollstonecraft • John Stuart Mill • Karl Marx • W. E. B. Du Bois • Martin Heidegger • Hannah Arendt • Confucius Contributors Sheryl D. Breen, W. Scott Cameron, Peter F. Cannavò, Joel Jay Kassiola, Joseph H. Lane Jr. Timothy W. Luke, John M. Meyer, Özgüç Orhan, Barbara K. Seeber, Francisco Seijo, Kimberly K. Smith, Piers H. G. Stephens, Zev Trachtenberg, Andrew Valls, Harlan Wilson. (shrink)

An important feature of some recent jurisprudential writings is the tendency to reject the precept of liberal individualism which affirms the priority of the principles of the "right conduct" over the substantive conceptions of "the good". This rejection, explicit in a recent book by Rogers M. Smith, and implicit in a recent work by Guido Calabresi, leads to strikingly illiberal consequences; hence, this provides indirect confirmation that the priority of the right over the good constitutes the most reliable defense (...) of individual liberty against majoritarian oppression. In Smith, an attempt to replace this priority with the principle of "rational liberty" leads to the disappearance of the guarantees of minority rights against orthodox majorities; in Calabresi, the doctrine of weighing and balancing competing moral principles of "the good" fails to provide an explanation for the strongly held moral intuition that some external preferences have to be disqualified at the outset, before they enter the forum of moral bargaining. (shrink)

Lane Craig, for example, asserts, that it is "intuitively obvious." 1 This approach is not promising since this principle is not self evident. A principle p is self evident if and only if everybody who understands p believes p, but many philosophers and cosmologists not only believe it possible.

Tense, and Time , and William Lane Craig’s in The Tensed Theory of Time . Their ontologies differ greatly, however, and (before I discuss their particular ontologies) I shall concentrate at the outset on some general themes of presentism. You can search..

William Lane Craig maintains that propositions and properties are not real. Yet, if we examine his proposed nominalism and his appeal to Rudolf Carnap’s linguistic frameworks, we can find that his view depends upon their reality, even as abstract objects. By drawing upon phenomenological insights, I argue that if we pay close attention to what can be before our minds in conscious awareness, we can become aware that there is more to what is real than simple, concrete particulars, even (...) in his linguistic examples. We can become aware of the reality of Platonic, ante rem universals, including propositions and properties. (shrink)

William Lane Craig rejects Platonism (the view that uncreated abstract objects (AOs) exist) in favor of nominalism because he believes Platonism fatally compromises God’s aseity. For Craig, concrete particulars (including essences) exist, but properties do not. Yet, we use property-talk, following Carnap’s “linguistic frameworks.” There is, however, a high cost to Craig’s view. I survey his views and then explore the importance of essences. But, next, I show that his nominalism undermines them. Thus, we have just interpretations of reality. (...) Worse, nominalism undermines creation’s determinacy. Last, I suggest AOs are created, but in a more fundamental sense than Craig considers. (shrink)

Though William Lane Craig believes his anti-Platonism is compatible with objective, Christian morality, I argue that it is not. First, I survey the main contours of his nominalism. Second, I discuss how he sees those points in relation to objective, Christian morality. Then, I argue that his view cannot sustain the qualitative aspects of moral virtues or principles, or even human beings. Moreover, Craig’s view loses any connection between those morals and humans, thereby doing great violence to objective, Christian (...) morals. Finally, I sketch two advantages of a Platonic realism in regards to Christian morals. (shrink)

Reviews the book, The psychology of existence: An integrative, clinical perspective by Kirk Schneider and Rollo May . In light of what they see as a growing interest in existential psychology among training clinicians and researchers, Schneider and May have authored a text which introduces the existential movement and outlines clinical applications of existentialism in psychotherapy. The text's most significant contribution is the latter—the presentation of a guiding clinical framework for conducting the "existential- integrative approach" in psychotherapy. While many (...) personality and psychotherapy texts include introductory chapters about existentialism, few discuss how therapy cases are conceptualized and conducted from an existential therapeutic orientation. This text is an important contribution to the clinical psychology training literature. In traditional clinical training programs, existential approaches to psychotherapy are often overlooked, because such approaches are viewed as purely philosophical rather than clinically applicable. Schneider and May challenge this view. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The kind of theological schools that prevail in the US today emerged as hubs of networks of voluntary societies in the early national period. Through a brief history of Lyman Beecher and Lane Theological Seminary, I show both the power of these networks of voluntary associations to connect free individuals and their role in the project of white Protestant settlement. Now every part of those networks is eroding. Critics who blame this erosion on narcissistic individuals understate the individualizing powers (...) of neoliberal orders. We cannot scold people back into community. Instead, we should begin with ideals that exist, in however ideological a form, in the present. Drawing on thinkers like Theodor Adorno, Ulrich Beck, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, bell hooks, Alicia Garza, and Rowan Williams, I argue for a critical redemption of “authenticity” that could reorient theological schools and renew forms of sociality to which they are connected. (shrink)

According to a Millian theory of names, co-referring names are intersubstitutable salva veritate in all contexts, including the that-clauses of belief reports. This leads the Millian to famously argue, among other things, that if Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly then she also believes that Clark Kent can fly. Although the Millian provides an ingenious account that explains our strong anti-substitution intuitions in such cases, this paper argues that the Millian account leads to a new problem of enlightenment (...) in identity reports. Specifically, a believer A may come to discover that two names refer to the same individual S, but whether A is enlightened about the identity of S will depend on the number of guises through which A holds contradictory beliefs about S. (shrink)

Since the mid 1960s, scientifically informed theists have been ecstatic because of Big bang cosmology. Theists believe the best scientific evidence that God exists is the evidence that the universe began to exist in an explosion about fifteen billion years ago. It began in an explosion called the Big Bang. Theists think it obvious that the universe could not have begun to exist uncaused. They argue that the most reasonable hypothesis is that the cause of the universe is God. This (...) theory hinges on the assumption that it is obviously true that whatever begins to exist has a cause. The most recent statement of this theist theory is in William Lane Craig's 1994 book Reasonable Faith 1]. Now there is a very interesting quote from this book which I will read to you at length because, at the end of this quote, Craig mentions me as one of the perverse atheists who deny the obviousness of the theistic principle. So let me quote to you how Craig states his argument 2]: The argument may be formulated in three simple steps: 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (shrink)

These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).

Although both books discussed in this review essay address problems with relevance to our present day and its dilemmas, they have different chronological scopes and employ different methods of interpretation. Robertson focuses exclusively on the era of the “Enlightenment” (c. 1680–1790), eschewing overt “presentism” to treat a wide range of authors and works as they addressed one another in the context of the events and developments of the period, mainly in Britain, France, and Germany. Friedman's aim, emphasizing the role of (...) “religious” thought, is to explore the roots of present-day “thinking” about economics as a “science” and debates about economic policy. His book, beginning its coverage in Western Europe in the later 17th century and, following a “history of ideas” approach, gives pride of place to Adam Smith's ideas in the formulation of a “coherent” economic theory, and then in a linear account, centered on America, describes the key steps that he argues led from Smith to the present. This review essay, concentrating on what each book has to say about the Enlightenment, juxtaposes their accounts of the era and offers critical judgment of their differing treatments of its character and accomplishments. (shrink)

Quentin Smith argues that if God exists, He had a duty to ensure life's existence; and He couldn't rationally have done so and made a big bang unless a counter-factual like "If God had made a big bang, there would have been life," was true pre-creation. But such counter-factuals are not true pre-creation. I argue that God could have made a big bang without irrationality; and that He could have ensured life without making big bangs non-random. Further, a proper (...) understanding of the truth-conditions of counter-factuals like the one above lets them have determinate truth-values pre-creation. But the explanation of how the above counter-factual can be true pre-creation is more complicated than that offered by William Lane Craig. (shrink)

This paper is a critical review of *Big Bang Cosmology* by Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. (The book is a collection of previously published papers; most are concerned, in one way or another, with kalam cosmological arguments for the existence of God.).

Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...) for an explanation. Having an alternative in hand, one that shows promise of achieving explanatory adequacy, provides an additional reason to suspend the search for unique constituents. In short, a negative and a positive thesis are developed: we should cease looking for unique constituents and should seek to explain mineness in accord with the model developed here. This model rejects attempts to explain the phenomenon in terms of either a narrative or a minimal sense of self; it seeks to explain at a “molecular” level, one that appeals to multiple, interacting dimensions. The molecular-level model allows for the possibility that subjective perspective is distinct from a stark perspective (one that does not imply mineness). It proposes that the confounding of tacit expectations plays an important role in explaining mental ownership and its complement, disownership. But the confounding of tacit expectations is not sufficient. Because we are able to be aware of the existence of mental states that do not belong to self, we require a mechanism for determining degree of self-relatedness. One such mechanism is proposed here, and it is shown how this mechanism can be integrated into a general model of mental ownership. In the spirit of suggesting how this model might be able to help resolve outstanding problems, the question as to whether inserted thoughts belong to the patient who reports them is also considered. (shrink)

Since Freud, clinicians have understood that disturbing memories contribute to psychopathology and that new emotional experiences contribute to therapeutic change. Yet, controversy remains about what is truly essential to bring about psychotherapeutic change. Mounting evidence from empirical studies suggests that emotional arousal is a key ingredient in therapeutic change in many modalities. In addition, memory seems to play an important role but there is a lack of consensus on the role of understanding what happened in the past in bringing about (...) therapeutic change. The core idea of this paper is that therapeutic change in a variety of modalities, including behavioral therapy, cognitive-behavioral therapy, emotion-focused therapy, and psychodynamic psychotherapy, results from the updating of prior emotional memories through a process of reconsolidation that incorporates new emotional experiences. We present an integrated memory model with three interactive components – autobiographical (event) memories, semantic structures, and emotional responses – supported by emerging evidence from cognitive neuroscience on implicit and explicit emotion, implicit and explicit memory, emotion-memory interactions, memory reconsolidation, and the relationship between autobiographical and semantic memory. We propose that the essential ingredients of therapeutic change include: (1) reactivating old memories; (2) engaging in new emotional experiences that are incorporated into these reactivated memories via the process of reconsolidation; and (3) reinforcing the integrated memory structure by practicing a new way of behaving and experiencing the world in a variety of contexts. The implications of this new, neurobiologically grounded synthesis for research, clinical practice, and teaching are discussed. (shrink)

For many years, Charles Peirce maintained that all senses of the modal terms "possible" and "necessary" can be defined in terms of "states of information." But in 1896, he was motivated by his work in set theory to criticize that account of modality, and in 1905 he characterized that criticism as a return "to the Aristotelian doctrine of a real possibility ... the great step that was needed to render pragmaticism an intelligible doctrine." But since Peirce was a realist about (...) modality before 1896, and since he continued defining "possibility" in terms of "states of information" after that date, it is not clear exactly what he changed his mind about. In this essay I explain what it was that Peirce changed his mind about and why, in retrospect, he viewed that change as a decisive step in the development of pragmaticism. (shrink)